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Abstract
In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental
Agreements (IEAs). We show that the welfare of the signatories does not
increase monotonically with respect to the number of signatories. We provide
an analytical solution of the leadership model. In particular, we ﬁnd that the
unique stable IEA consist of either two, three or four signatories if the number
of countries is greater than 4. Furthermore, we show that the welfare of the
signatories is almost at its lowest level when the IEA is stable. While in our
model countries’ choice variable is emissions, we extend our results to the case
where the choice variable is abatement eﬀorts.
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11 Introduction
Some of the most important environmental problems urgently calling for solution
are problems related to transboundary pollution. Environmental problems such as
ozone depletion, climate change and marine pollution have been the focus of intense
negotiations at the international level over the past two decades. Given the high
priority environmental problems receive at the policy front, it is not surprising that
there is a growing eﬀort to analyze International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) at
the theoretical front. A signiﬁcant part of the literature on IEAs utilizes game theory
to model the formation of a single coalition that reduces pollution. There are two main
directions in which the IEA literature has been developed over the last ﬁfteen years.
The ﬁrst argues that the formation of an IEA resembles the voluntary provision of a
public good (with externalities) and formalizes countries’ behavior as a cooperative
game. It shows that an IEA ratiﬁed by all countries is stable (Chander and Tulkens
(1995) and (1997)). The second direction uses the tools of non-cooperative game
theory to model the formation of an IEA. The latter is the direction we follow in this
paper.
The non-cooperative approach examines both the case where all countries (mem-
bers or not of the IEA) make their decisions simultaneously (Carraro & Siniscalco
(1993)), as well as the case where the countries that have ratiﬁed the IEA (signato-
ries) act as a leader, whose decision precedes the decision of the countries that remain
outside the IEA (Barrett (1994)). The simultaneous case has been resolved by De
Cara & Rotillon (2001), Finus & Rundshagen (2001) and Rubio & Casino (2001)
leading to the conclusion that, when cost and beneﬁt functions are quadratic, the
stable IEA will involve no more than 2 countries. In the leadership approach the
most important contributions are based so far on simulations. While the size of the
stable IEA remains unknown, simulations in Barrett (1994) suggest that a stable IEA
may include a large number of countries, even the grand coalition. We believe that
the leadership model, in which an individual country that decides unilaterally will
wait to observe the decision of a coalition whose emission will inﬂuence signiﬁcantly
global pollution, is compelling enough to warrant further investigation. Thus, in this
paper we adopt the leadership model which we solve analytically and our results
complement the simulated ones in Barrett (1994).
2In particular, each country’s welfare (or payoﬀ) is expressed as the diﬀerence be-
tween the beneﬁts from the country’s emissions and the damages from the aggregate
emissions. In the leadership literature it is assumed that, in the ﬁrst stage, countries
signing the IEA form a coalition and behave cooperatively by maximizing the coali-
tion’s aggregate welfare and in the second stage, the countries that do not participate
in the agreement observe the results of the agreement and behave non-cooperatively by
maximizing their individual welfare. Naturally, when the coalition (leader) maximizes
its welfare in the ﬁrst stage, it foresees and takes into account the non-signatories’
(followers) behavior. Due to the lack of supra-national authorities that could enforce
non-binding agreements, IEAs have to be self-enforcing in the sense that they are
immune to deviation by the countries involved . An IEA is considered to be stable if
none of its signatories has an incentive to withdraw (this aspect of stability is known
as Internal Stability) and none of the non-signatories has an incentive to further par-
ticipate in the agreement (this aspect of stability is known as External Stability)1.
Such a coalitional stability notion was originally introduced by D’Aspremont et. al
(1983) in the study of stable cartels in a price leadership model. However, our model
and D’ Aspremont et al.’s (1983) model diﬀer signiﬁcantly: (i) while in our model
non-members behave strategically in theirs they behave as price takers, (ii) unlike the
cartel formation case, in the IEA case members’ welfare does not increase monotoni-
cally with respect to the size of the coalition. We study the problem of deriving the
size of a stable IEA in a model very similar to Barrett (1994) with the main diﬀerence
being the choice variable: in our model countries choose emission levels whereas in
his they choose abatement eﬀorts.
The main contribution of this paper is the complete analytical solution of the
coalition formation model with quadratic beneﬁt and damage functions. We ﬁnd that
a stable coalition consists of either 2, 3 or 4 members if the total number of countries
is greater than 4. Furthermore, we show that the welfare level of the signatories is
very close to its lowest value when the IEA is stable. Our results corroborate the
outcome of the static models by anticipating very little participation in an IEA. In
fact, the predicted size of a stable IEA is so small in both static and dynamic models
1The reader should take note that the notions of Internal and External stability introduced in
this paper are completely diﬀerent from those introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
within the concept of the (abstract) stable set.
3that contradicts empirical observations2 and establishes the need for an alternative
approach to modeling countries’ behavior in international environmental negotiations.
Along this vain, Hoel and Schneider (1997) propose a simultaneous model similar to
that of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) with one major diﬀerence: they introduce non-
environmental costs incurred by the non-signatories3. In particular, in the primitive
simultaneous model, when a country exits the coalition, there are two forces in eﬀect:
(i) the increase in its own emissions that results in higher beneﬁts (e.g. due to
cheaper production), and (ii) the increase in total emission levels that results in higher
damages (e.g. due to an increase in global environmental pollution). If the increase
in beneﬁts exceeds the increase in damages the country has indeed an incentive to
exit. Hoel and Schneider (1997) introduce an additional cost incurred by the exiting
country representing non-environmental costs such as political ones. Naturally, if this
additional cost is high enough it may reverse the original incentives, inducing thus
the country to stay in the coalition. Due to this eﬀect, Hoel and Schneider (1997) are
able to support larger coalitions, including the grand coalition.
Our work parallels that of Konishi and Lin (1999) in terms of the coalition forma-
tion analysis employed. However, in Konishi and Lin (1999) the primitive model is
cartel formation with Cournot fringe whereas in this paper it is IEA formation. While
the two models share many common features, among which free-riding incentives by
the coalition members, there are nevertheless, signiﬁcant diﬀerences. As we show
in this paper, an IEA can never contain more than 4 countries whereas a cartel, as
Konishi and Lin (1999) show, may include a larger number of ﬁrms.
Our results, severely restricting the size of stable coalitions, complement Barrett’s
(1994) suggestion that stable IEAs could consist of any large number of countries
by relating the size of a stable coalition to the domain of the choice variable. We
convert our model’s choice variable from emission levels to abatement eﬀorts making,
thus, our model directly comparable to his framework. In doing so, we formulate the
2For example, from the 194 members of the United Nations General Assembly, 184 have ratiﬁed
the Montreal Protocol, 158 the Basel Convention, 164 the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species and although the Kyoto Protocol has not come into eﬀect yet, it has been
ratiﬁed by 119 countries, 29 of which belong to the Annex I countries.
3Additionally the damage function is linear as opposed to quadratic but this makes their analysis
simpler without disturbing the results. It is shown in De Cara & Rotillon (2001) and Finus and
Rundshagen (2001) that this simpler version without non-environmental costs results also in very
small coalitions.
4link between the two approaches and show that our results survive such a conversion.
Assuming that abatement cannot exceed the current ﬂow of emissions we show that
Barrett’s (1994) model yields stable coalitions consisting of no more than 4 members.
It is only when abatement can exceed the current ﬂow of emissions, such as in the
case of a stock pollutant whose stock could be technologically and economically viable
to reduce, that Barrett’s (1994) model could support stable IEAs consisting of more
than 4 countries. The proofs of all the results presented in the paper are delineated
in the appendix.
2 The model
We assume that there exist n identical countries, N = {1,...,n}. Production and
consumption in each country i generates emissions ei ≥ 0 of a global pollutant as
an output. The term global pollutant indicates that we assume pollution to be a
public bad and that individual emission impose negative externalities on all other
countries. Similarly, in Section 4 where the model is speciﬁed in terms of abatement
eﬀort, individual abatement eﬀort is assumed to be a public good. The social welfare
of country i, wi, is expressed as the net between the total beneﬁts from country i’s
emissions, Bi(ei), and the damages Di(E) from the aggregate emissions, E, including
country i’s emissions. Since countries are assumed to be identical we henceforth drop
the subscripts from the functions. As each country i’s emission level increases, its
beneﬁts B(ei) increase as well. We consider the following quadratic beneﬁt function






, where a and b are positive parameters.
Country i’s damages from pollution depend on aggregate pollution, E,w h e r eE =
 
i∈N ei. We assume a quadratic damage function for each country i ∈ N,o ft h e
following form D(E)=1
2c(E)2, where c is a positive parameter.4

















4An alternative form of the damage function is also used in the literature, see for example Barrett
(1994). According to their functional form, each country’s damages are a share of aggregate emis-
sions, that is, D(E)= 1
2nc(E)2. The diﬀerence between the two forms is a diﬀerence in parameter
speciﬁcation and it does not aﬀect the results. The full analysis using this alternative functional
form is available to the interested reader upon request.
5The (pure) non-cooperative case: In the non-cooperative case each country
chooses its emission level taking the other countries’ emissions as given. That is,
country i behaves in a typical Cournot fashion maximizing equation (1). The ﬁrst or-






Since we have assumed complete symmetry, all countries generate the same level






where γ = c
b. Consequently, the aggregate emission level under the (purely) non-
cooperative case is, Enc = nenc = na
1+γn.
Full cooperation: Under full cooperation, the grand coalition maximizes the joint
welfare. The ﬁrst order condition yields the aggregate emission level, Ec = an
γn2+1.
Since each country contributes 1









It is easily veriﬁable that each country emits less and is better oﬀ in the case of
full cooperation than under non-cooperation, that is, ec <e n and wc >w n.
However, in this one stage, purely simultaneous framework each country has an
incentive to cheat on the agreement and free-ride on the emission reduction achieved
by the countries complying with the agreement. In what follows we examine the
two stage framework where the incentive to free ride on the coalition’s cooperating
eﬀorts may be oﬀset by the adjustment of the coalition’s emissions upon a member’s
deviation. The equilibrium number of countries participating in an IEA, is derived
by applying the notions of internal and external stability of a coalition as was orig-
inally developed by D’Aspremont et. al (1983) and extended to IEAs by Carraro &
Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994).
Coalition Formation: Assume that a set S ⊂ N of countries sign an agreement
and N\S do not. Let the size of coalition S be |S| = s, the total emission generated
by the coalition be Es, w h i l ee a c hm e m b e ro ft h ec o a l i t i o ne m i t ses such that Es = ses.
6In a similar manner, each non-signatory country emits ens, yielding a total emission
level Ens =( n − s)ens.
The non-signatories behave non-cooperatively after having observed the choice of
signatories. Their maximization problem results to a best response function of the
form presented earlier. However, now only n−s countries stay outside of the emission
reduction agreement emitting ens, while the rest s countries emit in total Es,t h a ti s
 
i∈N ei =( n−s)ens+ses. Substituting this into the reaction function yields each non-
signatory country’s emissions ens =
a−γses
1+γ(n−s) as a function of the signatory countries’
emission es. The aggregate non-signatory emission level is Ens =
(a−γses)(n−s)
1+γ(n−s) .
Signatories choose their emission level by maximizing their collective welfare while
taking into account the behavior of non-signatories. That is, signatories choose es by
solving the following maximization problem,
max
es
s[B(es) − D(ses +( n − s)ens(es))] .








where Ψ=X2 + γs2 and X =1+γ (n − s). The aggregate emission level by the






. Substituting the value of es into the reaction function
of non-signatories yields,











The full-cooperative and the pure non-cooperative solutions can be derived as
special cases of the above solution. That is, when s = n, the problem reduces to
the full cooperative solution and es = ec,w h i l ew h e ns =0 , it reduces to the pure
non-cooperative solution, and, ens = enc.





Unlike the previous two cases where enc > 0 and ec > 0 always hold, in the
coalition formation case we have to restrict the parameters of the model in order to
7guarantee that our solutions are interior, that is, we need to restrict the parameters
so that es > 0 and ens > 0. The following Proposition establishes the necessary
conditions for interior solutions.
Proposition 1 es > 0 if and only if γ< 4
n(n−4) and n>4,e ns > 0 if γ< 4
n(n−4) and
n>4.
The intuitive explanation behind these conditions is that for emissions to be posi-
tive it must be that the relative impact of damages to beneﬁts is not very high (recall
that γ = c/b). Although such a restriction may seem benign at ﬁrst, it is of great
importance since it is this condition that restricts the size of the stable coalition to
2, 3 or 4 countries as we formally show in Section 3.
Despite its importance, this condition has been overlooked so far, simply because
the model is most commonly deﬁned in terms of abatement eﬀorts rather than in
terms of emissions (the prominent example is the work of Barrett (1994)). In Section
4 we convert our model’s choice variable to abatement eﬀort and, while establishing
the direct link between the two models, we extend the constraint to the converted
model as well, validating, thus, the immunity of our results to the selection of choice
variable.
The last step in fully formulating our model is the determination of the welfare
level of signatories and non-signatories for any given s. This is done by simply substi-
tuting the emission levels es, ens and E with their equilibrium values from equations
4, 5 and 6 respectively into the corresponding welfare functions. We denote the in-
direct welfare function of the signatories by ωs while that of the non-signatories by




















The properties of these indirect welfare functions are established in Proposition
2.
Proposition 2 Consider the indirect welfare functions of signatory and non-signatory
countries, ωs(s) and ωns(s) respectively and let zmin =
1+γn
1+γ . Then,
1. zmin =a r gm i n s∈ ∩[0,n]ωs(s),
82. ωs(s) increases in s if s>z min and it decreases in s if s<z min,
3. ωns(s) ≶ ωs(s) for all s ≶ zmin.
4. If, moreover, zmin is an integer then the two indirect welfare levels are equal at
s = zmin that is, ωns(smin)=ωs(smin).
We would like to point out that these indirect welfare functions do not exhibit
the same properties with those in D’ Aspremont et al. (1983). While in the latter
paper the welfare functions are monotonically increasing, in our analysis there exist
situations (with suﬃciently small coalitions), where a country is better oﬀ as a member
of the coalition than outside of the coalition and as the coalition grows its members’
welfare drops. The diﬀerence stems from the fact that in the price leadership model
the fringe behaves non-strategically, i.e., its members behave as price-takers, not
conceptualizing the impact of their actions on the market price. Whereas, in the
IEAs case the non-signatories behave strategically by explicitly taking into account
the negative eﬀect their individual emissions have on their welfare via global pollution.
Not surprisingly, the same observation is been made in Konishi and Lin (1999).
3 The size of stable IEAs
We now proceed with the determination of the size of the stable IEA, denoted by s∗,
using the internal and external stability conditions. Recall that the internal stability
condition ensures that if a country were to defect unilaterally, its gains from free
riding would be outweighed by the adjustment (due to its defection) of the emission
levels of the remaining members of the IEA. The external stability condition ensures
that no other non-signatory country ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to unilaterally join the IEA.
Formally, the internal and external stability conditions are,
ωs(s
∗) ≥ ωns(s
∗ − 1) and ωs(s
∗ +1 )≤ ωns(s
∗) ,
respectively. The following proposition establishes all the possible sizes of the unique
stable IEA.
Proposition 3 For n>4 there exists a unique stable IEA whose size s∗ is such that
s∗ ∈{ 2,3,4}.
9We illustrate the results presented in Proposition 3 by considering a numerical
example that leads to s∗ =3 .W e a s s u m e n =1 0 , a =1 0 , b =6and c =0 .39999,
which result in γ =0 .066665. Observe that γ< 4
n(n−4) ⇔ 0.066665 < 0.066667












I nb o t hF i g u r e s1a n d2ωs(s) is depicted by the solid line, ωns(s) by the crossed
line and ωns(s−1) by the dashed line. All three indirect welfare functions are plotted
against diﬀerent coalition sizes s. While Figure 1 plots the functions for all possible
values of s =0 ,...,10, Figure 2 focuses on the values of interest, that is, s =1 ,...,4.
Observe that coalition s∗ =3is internally stable, i.e., ωs(s∗) >ω ns(s∗ − 1) since the
dashed curve is below the solid curve. Moreover, s∗ =3is externally stable, i.e.,
ωs(s∗ +1 )<ω ns(s∗) since s∗ +1is after the intersection of the dashed and the solid
curves. Therefore, the coalition of size s∗ =3is stable.
Remark 1 An important observation stemming from the above analysis is that the
size of the stable coalition is slightly larger than that for which the welfare of the
signatories is at its minimum.
Closer to our results, Rubio and Casino (2001) have suggested that a coalition
consisting of two countries is the only stable coalition, but, their result is derived by
constraining the indirect welfare levels to be positive. Such a constraint is unjustiﬁed
since welfare functions are invariant to positive monotonic transforms and hence their
cardinal values are insigniﬁcant.
104 Emissions vs Abatement
As we mentioned in the previous section, our result in Proposition 3 regarding the
size of the stable coalition complements that of Barrett (1994) where the same type of
quadratic beneﬁts and costs functions are used. Although the main diﬀerence between
Barrett’s (1994) and our model is the choice variable, abatement eﬀort and emissions
respectively, the diﬀerence in the results is not due to the choice variable but rather
to the restrictions imposed on the choice variable. As we show in this section the
two models are equivalent and all results carry over, as long as abatement does not
exceed the ﬂow of emission. The diﬀerence arises in the case of a stock pollutant,
whose stock could be technologically and economically viable to reduce.5 In such case
it could be possible to abate more than the current ﬂow of emission, that is, it could
be possible to have a negative net ﬂow of emission. Then, Proposition 3 does not
hold anymore eliminating, thus, the diﬀerence between our present work and Barrett’s
(1994) contribution. Lemma 4, however, applies to both models and the stable IEA
remains the largest integer below zmin+1, while the pessimistic observation, outlined
by Remark 1, that a stable IEA is (almost) the least rewarding to its members is still
in eﬀect. That is, when the feasibility constraint is not binding we can have large
coalitions whose members attain close to the lowest, in terms of coalition size, net
welfare.
In the rest of this section we illustrate that the two models are directly comparable
when abatement is deﬁned as a reduction in the ﬂow of emission. Barrett (1994)
assumes that countries derive beneﬁts from aggregate abatement Q,w i t hc o u n t r yi’s
beneﬁts given by Bi(Q)=
ˆ b
n(ˆ aQ − 1
2Q2). E a c hc o u n t r y ’ sc o s t sd e p e n do ni t so w n
abatement, that is, Ci(qi)= ˆ c
2q2
i,w h e r eˆ b, ˆ a and ˆ c are parameters and n denotes
the number of countries.6 Within this framework, it is asserted in Barrett (1994,
Proposition 1) that stable IEAs can be signed by a large number of countries for low
values of ˆ γ = ˆ c
ˆ b, that is, when the importance of own abatement costs is small relative
5For example, in the case of carbon dioxide serious consideration is given recently to the technolog-
ical option of geological and oceanic storage, usually referred to as carbon sequestration. Although
currently at the experimental stage, its pottential is explored both at national and international
level. UNFCCC has invited IPCC to prepare a Special Report on the subject, and the results of the
ﬁrst workshop were presented in the 20th Session of IPCC, see IPCC-XX/Doc.19 (10.II.2003).
6We added hats in the symbols b, a and c to distinghuish them from the ones we have already
used.
11to the beneﬁts derived from aggregate abatement. Although the model can be solved
in a manner parallel to ours, the goal here is to derive the abatement model from the
emission model, establishing the equivalence between them.7
If, as discussed earlier, abatement eﬀort is deﬁned as a reduction in the ﬂow of
emissions then abatement is meaningful only in the presence of emissions, and thus,
the maximum level of abatement is constrained by the maximum uncontrolled ﬂow of
emissions. In other words, the abatement model is derived from the emission model.
Denote by E the uncontrolled, aggregate emissions level, that is, the level of emissions
associated with zero abatement, and by E the controlled emissions level we derived in
the previous section. According to the above deﬁnition of abatement the domain of Q,
as captured by Bi(Q), should be derived from the emissions model that independently
determines the level of uncontrolled emissions. That is, each country’s uncontrolled
level of emissions is derived directly from its beneﬁt function Bi(ei) a n di ti se = a,
and thus, E = na. By extension, country speciﬁc and aggregate abatements are
then deﬁned as qi = e − ei,a n dQ = E − E = na − E respectively. Substituting





ˆ a(na − E) − 1
2 (na − E)
2 
− ˆ c
2(a−ei)2 .This expression can take the following
form which facilitates direct comparison with the welfare function speciﬁed in terms
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,w h e r eγ h a sb e e nd e ﬁ n e di nS e c t i o n2a sγ = c
b.N o t e t h a t
the last term is just a constant that only scales welfare levels and does not aﬀect
the solution of the problem. Therefore, the same solution is derived whether we
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i,a sl o n ga sˆ c = b, ˆ b = nc, ˆ a = na,a n d
ˆ γ = ˆ c
ˆ b = 1
γn. For example, one can derive the abatement level of signatory countries
using equation (4) in Section 2 (es = a −
aγsn
Ψ ), simply by recalling the deﬁnition of
abatement, that is, es = e − qs which implies that qs =
aγsn
Ψ .8
7We can provide the full solution to the interested reader on demand.
8Simple parameter transformation using the deﬁnitions in the begining of the paragraph yields
12Using the above equivalence between the two models we can now support the de-
rived abatement model speciﬁcation with the necessary constraints from the primary
emission model. Recall that Proposition 2 provides the necessary conditions to ensure
that the choice variables are positive, that is, es ≥ 0 and ens ≥ 0. These constraints
though, imply the following conditions for the corresponding abatement levels, qs ≤ a,
and qns ≤ a. Note that the latter constraints are equivalent with the ones stemming
from the beneﬁt function Bi(Q), that is Q ≤ ˆ a which implies q ≤ ˆ a
n = an
n = a.
Since the parameters ˆ a,ˆ b and ˆ c are directly derived from the emission model, they




Replacing c and b yields
ˆ b/n
ˆ c < 4
n(n−4) which is equivalent to ˆ γ = ˆ c
ˆ b > n−4
4 .
If these conditions are taken into account, it is immediate that the admissible sizes
of a stable coalition reduce to 2, 3, and 4 as was the case in Section 3. To illustrate the
equivalence between the two models consider the ﬁrst example constructed in Barrett
(1994). The parameters’ values are n =1 0 , ˆ a =1 0 0 , ˆ b =1and ˆ c =0 .25, implying ˆ γ =
ˆ c
ˆ b =0 .25, and the stable coalition allegedly consists of four countries. However, the
chosen values of ˆ b and ˆ c clearly violate the maximum abatement constraint established
earlier, requiring that ˆ γ>1.5. The violation of the maximum abatement constraint
is evident from the data presented in Barrett (1994, Table 1), since the abatement
of signatory countries exceeds the corresponding uncontrolled level of emissions e =
ˆ a
n =1 0 . That is, each signatory abates more than it can ever emit. In this case,
restricting ˆ γ>1.5 yields stable coalitions consisting of either two or three countries
depending on the value of ˆ γ. In general, restricting the value of ˆ γ to the admissible
range, we ﬁnd that the stable coalition consists of either two, three or four countries,
depending on how close the value of ˆ γ is to its lower bound.
5 Conclusions
The present paper studies the size of stable coalitions that ratify IEAs concerning
transboundary environmental problems. A coalition is considered stable when no
signatories wish to withdraw while no more countries wish to participate. Within
this framework we show that, contrary to the general perception in the literature, the
qs =
ˆ aαˆ γ
(ˆ γ+1−α)2+α2nˆ γ, which if multiplied by nα yields the total abatement level of signatory countries,
given in equation (6), p. 882, Barrett (1994).
13welfare levels of both the signatories and the non-signatories do not monotonically
increase in the size of the coalition. Furthermore, in the case of small coalitions,
signatories are better oﬀ than non-signatories while as the coalition grows suﬃciently
the opposite is true.
We ﬁnd that the size of the stable coalition is not only very small, but it is also
invariant to the value of the model’s parameters. Moreover, it is very close to the
worst, in terms of the members’ welfare, coalition size.
All these problematic features of a stable coalition suggest that there exists a
caveat in the model. One explanation of the results is that when each country acts
it does not foresee the disappointing outcome in which it may end up. Instead,
it myopically concentrates on its own action ignoring the reactions of others. In
a companion to this paper we study stable IEAs when countries behave in a more
sophisticated manner and are forward looking.
There are, however, other venues one can explore. Asymmetry among countries
has not yet been studied while in the real world it is widespread. For example,
not all countries posses identical technologies, leading thus, to varying abating costs.
Similarly, the (perceived) impact of environmental damages diﬀers from country to
country, hence the Damage function can vary as well. Such asymmetries can be
incorporated in our model by indexing parameter γ by country. Then, a coalition
will be characterized not only by its size but also by the identity of those in it.
Spatial topology is another dimension that can be added to the basic model when
regional pollution problems are studied. Emissions from a given country may aﬀect
only its neighbors instead of all the countries. A network will be more appropriate in
modelling such a situation.
Lastly, in the present work it is assumed that there is only one IEA (hence one
coalition). Although it is a natural assumption, it would be very interesting to ex-
amine whether it is also the outcome of a model that allows ex ante many coalitions
to form. There are several works that model endogenous coalition formation, for
example Block (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999).
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167 Appendix
Although in our model s is a non-negative integer smaller than n,f o rt h ee a s eo f
exposition and calculations in the proofs we assume that s is a real number taking
values from [0,n]. When necessary, at the end of some proofs we convert s back to
being an integer.







Hence es > 0 ⇔ [1+ γ(n − s)]
2 −γs(n−s) > 0. Let A(s) = [1 + γ(n − s)]
2 −γs(n−
s)=1+γ(n − s)[γ(n − s) − (s − 2)] and consider s =a r gm i n s A(s)=
2γn+2+n
2γ+2 . For
A(s) > 0 for all s it suﬃces that A(s) > 0. Observe that since (n − s)= n−2
2γ+2 and
(s − 2) =
(n−2)(2γ+1)
2γ+2 we have A(s)=
4γn−γn2+4
4γ+4 . Then A(s) > 0 ⇔ 4γn− γn2 +4>
0 ⇔ γ< 4
n(n−4) and the latter is true from our hypothesis.











ens > 0 it suﬃces that [1 + γ(n − s)](1 − γs)+γs2 > 0.L e tΦ(s) = [1 + γ(n − s)](1 − γs)+
γs2 and consider ¯ s =a r g m i n sΦ(s)=
γn+2
2γ+2. For Φ(s) > 0 for all s it suﬃces that
Φ(¯ s) > 0. Observe that since 1+γ(n − ¯ s)=
γn(γ+2)+2













(2γ+2)2 .N o t i c et h a tf o rΦ(¯ s) > 0 it suﬃces that
2−γ2n
2γ+2 > 0 ⇔ γ<
 
2






n for all n ≥ 6 it is indeed the case that γ<
 
2
n if n ≥ 6.
Moreover, when n =5we have Φ(¯ s)=−1
4
25γ3−20γ−4
γ+1 . For Φ(¯ s) > 0 it suﬃces that
25γ3 − 20γ − 4 < 0 which is true since γ<4
5.
Proof of Proposition 2.
1-2 Observe that ∂ωs
∂s =
ba2γ2n2
Ψ2 (s − X). Thus, ∂ωs




∂s2 > 0 for all γ and n the ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient. Moreover, observe
that ∂ωs
∂s ≶ 0 if s ≶ X ⇔ s ≶ zmin.
3-4. Combining the expressions in (7), the welfare of non-signatory countries can be
expressed as a function of signatories’ welfare as follows: ωns = ωs+
ba2γ2n2
2Ψ2 (X+
s)(s−X). Then it is obvious that ωns ≶ ωs,f o rs ≶ X ⇔ s ≶ zmin. If, moreover,
zmin is an integer, then when s = zmin ⇔ s = X and ωns(zmin)=ωs(zmin).
17Proof of Proposition 3. Unfortunately, allowing s to take non-integer values
a n dt h e ns e t t i n gωs(z )=ωns(z  −1) where z  ∈ [0,n] does not provide an analytical
solution for z  due to computational limitations and the model has remained unsolved.
Fortunately, it is not z  that we are interested in, per se. Instead, it is the largest
integer s∗ ≤ z  that we are looking for as we formally explain in the Stability section
below.
We are able to bypass the diﬃculties of solving the complicated polynomial that
results from ωs(z )=ωns(z  − 1) by “guessing” some value ¯ z, that satisﬁes both sta-
bility conditions, not necessarily with equality. Then we adjust it to the appropriate
integer.
Stability:To illustrate our analysis we use Figure 3 below. The curve ωs(s) de-
notes the welfare of the signatories for a size of coalition s, while curves ωns(s) and
ωns(s − 1) denote the welfare of the non-signatories when the size of coalition is s
and s − 1 respectively. By its deﬁnition zmin is such that ωs(zmin)=ωns(zmin). We
now deﬁne ¯ z:= zmin +1 , and by Lemma 4 below we deduce that ¯ z satisﬁes the
internal and external stability conditions: ωs(¯ z) ≥ ωns(¯ z −1) and ωs(¯ z +1)≥ ωns(¯ z)
respectively.
Let z  be the smallest s such that ωs(z )=ωns(z  − 1). It is straight forward to
show9 that ωs(zmin) >ω ns(s − 1) for all s<¯ z. Then, from the internal and external
stability of ¯ z we can conclude that ¯ z<z   < ¯ z+1and hence ωs(s) >ω ns(s−1) for all
s<z  . Let  x  denote the largest integer that is less than or equal to (if x is an integer
itself) x. Then, the size of the stable coalition is s∗ =  z  . The internal stability
of s∗ (ωs(s∗) ≥ ωns(s∗ − 1)) is satisﬁed due to the fact that z  is, by deﬁnition,
the ﬁrst intersection between ωs(s) and ωns(s − 1), and since ωs(¯ z) >ω ns(¯ z − 1)
and ¯ z<z   we have ωs(s∗) ≥ ωns(s∗ − 1). Similarly, the external stability of s∗, i.e.,
ωns(s∗) ≥ ωs(s∗+1), is satisﬁed since ωns(s−1) >ω s(s) for all s>z   (as we illustrate
below, under the Uniqueness section) and s∗ +1>z  .
Recall that zmin =
γn+1
γ+1 , rearranging the expression yields γ = zmin−1
n−zmin. We know
that 0 <γ< 4
n(n−4), thus, 0 < zmin−1
n−zmin < 4
n(n−4). From 0 < zmin−1
n−zmin we get that
zmin > 1. From zmin−1
n−zmin < 4
n(n−4) we get that zmin < n2
n2−4n+4 < 2 if n>6. Therefore,
1 <z min < 2, and by extension 2 < ¯ z<3, and 3 < ¯ z +1< 4, hence 2 <z   < 4.
Since we know that 2 <z   < 4 we can conclude that if z  < 3 then s∗ =2(this is
9The calculations are available upon request.
18the case depicted in Figure 3), whereas if 3 ≤ z  then s∗ =3 .
Moreover, 1 <z min < 3 if 4 <n≤ 6, hence 2 < ¯ z<4 and 3 < ¯ z +1< 5, and
thus 2 <z   < 5. Then, the size of the stable coalition s∗ can take the values
s
∗ =2 if z
  < 3
s
∗ =3 if z
  < 4
s
∗ =4 if z
  ≥ 4
if 4 <n<6. In the special case where n =6the possibility of s∗ =4is ruled out
below when we show the uniqueness of s∗.
Figure 3
Uniqueness: We have already argued above that ωs(s) >ω ns(s − 1) for all s<z  .
Thus, all coalitions s<s ∗ are externally unstable since ωs(s +1 )>ω ns(s).I no r d e r
to show that s∗ is the only size of a stable IEA it suﬃces to show that all coalitions
of size s>z   are internally unstable, i.e., ωns(s − 1) >ω s(s), for all n>4.
Using the expressions in (7) we derive that








To show that ωns(s − 1) − ωs(s) > 0 for all s>z  suﬃces to show that Ξ(s)=
Ψ2(s−1)−Ψ(s)Ψ(s−1)+Ψ(s)γ(s−1)2 −Ψ(s)γX2(s−1) > 0. Substituting all the
relevant values, the expression can be further simpliﬁed to the following rather long
polynomial:
Ξ(s)=γ(−8γns+3− 4s − 12γ2sn − 2γ2ns3 +2 γ3ns +2 γns2 + γ3
+5γ2 +8 γ2n − 12γ2s +9 γ2s2 +1 5 γs2 +8 γ − 18γs+6 γn− 2γ3s
−2γ3s2 +2 γ3n − γ3n2 +2 γ2n2 − 6γ4ns2 +4 γ3s3 − 6γs3 − 2γ3n3
−γ4s2 +2 γ4s3 − γ4s4 + γ2s4 − 4γ2s3 − γ4n2 − 2γ4n3 − γ4n4
−8γ3ns2 − γ3s4 +4 γ4n3s + γs4 +6 γ4n2s +2 γ3s3n − γ3s2n2 +2 γ4ns
−4γ2n2s +8 γ2ns2 − 6γ4n2s2 + γ2n2s2 +4 γ4ns3 +6 γ3n2s + s2)
We know that ωns(s−1) = ωs(s) at s = z  for all n>4. We proceed by showing that
Φ (s)=dΦ
ds > 0 for all s ≥ ¯ z and for all n>4, where Φ(s)=1
γΞ(s). To do that we
show that it is positive at its lowest value, i.e., Φ (˜ s) > 0 where ˜ s =a r gm i ns≥¯ zΦ (s).




ds2 > 0. The calculations are omitted due to
their length and are available upon request.
Lemma 4 Consider ¯ z such that ¯ z = zmin+1, then ¯ z satisﬁes the internal and external
stability conditions.
Proof.
Internal stability: From Proposition 1 we know that ωs(zmin)=ωns(zmin) and
that ωs(s) increases in s if s>z min. Then, ωs(zmin+1) >ω s(zmin), thus, ωs(zmin+1) >
ωns(zmin) which is equivalent to the internal stability condition ωs(¯ z) >ω ns(¯ z − 1).
External stability: External stability is shown by substituting ¯ z =
γn+1
γ+1 +1
into the external stability condition ωns(¯ z) >ω s(¯ z +1 ) . The inequality reduces to
γ
2γ2n3+(−3γ2+4γ−γ3)n2+(8γ3+2γ+14γ2+2)n+6−γ2−4γ4−11γ3+14γ
(γ+1)3 ≥ 0. It suﬃces to show that
the following inequality holds:
⎡
⎣
2γ2n3 +( 4 γ − γ3 − 3γ2)n2
+(2+14γ2 +8 γ3 +2 γ)n
+6 + 14γ − γ2 − 4γ4 − 11γ3
⎤
⎦ ≥ 0.
Observe that 4γ − γ3 − 3γ2 ≥ 0 for γ ≤ 1,w h i l e6+1 4 γ − γ2 − 4γ4 − 11γ3 ≥ 0 for
γ<1.0937. Therefore, the external stability condition is satisﬁed since γ< 4
n(n−4)
and n>4 imply that γ<1.
20